Conflicting commitments

If you are interested in national economics there are many concise, decent papers written by one of my teachers at the SSE, Tore Ellingsen. Currently I’m on one of his articles (Disagreement and Authority, (co-author Topi Miettinen). This version June 2007) , which implies that conflicting commitments can explain why we have conflicts that seem to go on forever, even though the expected payoff of not fighting is probably considerably greater. The article is based on Schellings (1956) work in this matter, however Ellingsen&Miettinen introduce a new variable to make the model more complete, namely the cost of committing. They state that since there is a cost of committing to being aggressive (waging war) the fact that that cost is greater than the cost of staying flexible (which means not waging war) makes it more profitable to wager war. When these costs meet, both parties will be indifferent to both actions. However low costs for committing to aggression, that is to wage war, combined with uncertain roles, imply the highest risks of conflict.

Anyhow I wish you some pleasant reading.

/Rob